The Great Recession was characterized by two related phenomena: (i) a jobless recovery and (ii) a permanent drop in aggregate output. Data show that the United States, Europe, and even countries with lesser ties to the international …nancial system have su¤ered large permanent losses in aggregate output and employment since the …nancial crisis, despite unprecedented monetary injections. However, the symptoms of the Great Recession were not observed in China, despite a 45% permanent drop in its exports-one of the largest trade collapses in world history since the Great Depression.
However, the performances and e¤ects of stimulus programs vary greatly across countries.
In particular, China was the …rst major economy to recover from the …nancial tsunami. GDP growth in China rebounded to its double-digit pre-crisis rate in late 2009 (at 11.4% per year), less than one year after unveiling its stimulus package, and it rose signi…cantly above its longrun average in the …rst quarter of 2010 (at 12.2% per year). In contrast, GDP growth in the United states and Europe had not recovered to pre-crisis rates as of late 2011 even though they reacted to the crisis earlier than China. Most strikingly, GDP levels in these developed countries have declined permanently since 2008 by as much as 10% below their respective long-run trends, despite more than 5 years of continuing quantitative easing after the crisis. China's GDP level, however, fully rebounded to its long-run trend in early 2010 without appealing to unconventional monetary policies. Also, total industrial production in China nearly doubled between 2007 and 2013 despite the crisis and an extremely weak international demand for Chinese goods, whereas the United States has experienced zero growth in industrial production and that in the European Union and Japan has declined by 9.3% and 17.1%, respectively. No wonder China's economic growth contributed 50% of global GDP growth during the crisis period (IMF, 2010), even though its income level accounted for less than 10% of world GDP and its total exports have remained 45% below trend since the crisis. It thus appears that in the wake of the crisis and its aftermath, China has proved structurally and macroeconomically much stronger than developed countries in withstanding the global Great Recession. Therefore, one cannot help but wonder: What is special about
China and its stimulus programs?
Obviously, China was growing much faster than Western countries before the crisis. But simply growing faster before the crisis does not make China special in withstanding the crisis (see the detailed analysis in Section 2). Many Southeast Asian countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand, were growing rapidly before the Asian …nancial crisis in 1997, but all plunged into deep recessions (with negative growth rates) immediately after the Asian crisis.
It is also obvious that China's …nancial sector is not yet fully integrated into the global …nancial system, which may explain China's rapid recovery. However, several major developing countries, such as Russia and South Africa, were equally disengaged from the global …nancial system in terms of toxic …nancial assets and banking scandals, yet these economies su¤ered large permanent losses in GDP just like in the United States and Europe (see Section 2). A key reason for this loss is the collapse of exports: Like China, these developing economies all su¤ered a heavy blow to their export sectors.
As did many countries, the Chinese government injected massive amounts of money into its banking system in late 2008 and 2009. Thanks to sharp increases in aggregate investment immediately following the money injection, the Chinese economy rebounded quickly to its pre-crisis level and successfully prevented a possible Great Recession and economic collapse during China's critical period of economic transition and industrialization. Consequently, China emerged after the crisis as the world's number one manufacturing powerhouse and the only signi…cant engine of global economic growth.
How could Chinese banks …nd borrowers to lend a massive amount of credit so quickly to jump-start a fading economy while the U.S. and European banks were incapable of doing so? 1 Why were Chinese …rms willing to borrow to invest when both domestic and international demand collapsed and the future appeared so gloomy and uncertain?
In this paper, we argue that the key to China's success is not so much that China had a double-digit growth rate before the crisis, or because Chinese banks are more solvent or more detached from the global …nancial system than others, but rather because China implemented bold, decisive …scal stimulus programs that no other major nations dared to adopt. In particular, the Chinese government cleverly used its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as a …scal instrument to implement its aggressive stimulus programs in 2009, consistent with the very Keynesian notion of aggregate demand management through increased government spending and the …scal multiplier principle.
The empirical facts provided in Section 2 show that during the 2009 stimulus period 1 The 2007-2008 global …nancial collapse resulted in central banks around the world taking unprecedented action to combat weak aggregate demand in both consumption and investment. In the United States, The Federal Reserve Bank implemented a zero-interest rate policy, slashing the federal funds rate down to the range of 0-0.25 percent beginning late 2008. It was seven years later before the Fed raised rates by just 25 basis point. Today the fed funds rate stands at 1.68%, still at a historical low level. However, many industrial nations have implemented negative interest rate policies and such policies remain e¤ective today (see, e.g., Reinbold and Wen, 2017) .
when Chinese total exports collapsed, SOEs substantially expanded their credit borrowing and …xed investment. A rapid revival of private investment and GDP growth soon followed.
Although the relative size of the SOE sector has declined sharply since the market-oriented reform in 1978, it still accounted for 20% of total industrial employment in 2008 when the world …nancial crisis started. The SOEs' actions were thus able to generate a signi…cant countercyclical force against the meltdown of total exports and aggregate demand.
Therefore, SOEs in China acted very much like an automatic …scal stabilizer (or market coordinator) for the Chinese economy: When the economy is in recession, the SOEs consent to boosting production and investment spending; but in normal times, they are supposed to be pro…t maximizers just like privately owned enterprises (POEs), albeit possibly less e¢cient and pro…table. This ability of the public sector to move countercyclically helped insulate the Chinese economy from the global …nancial tsunami during the crisis period. Ex post, most of the public sector's losses resulting from inventory buildups and ine¢cient investment in 2009 have been repaid by the consequent continued booming economy. 2 Alternatively, had the SOEs not acted swiftly, the entire economy might have been crushed by the trade collapse and the consequent costs might have been very dear. 3 By comparing China's economic performance during the crisis with that in the West, the e¤ect of the stimulus package in China looks like a dream outcome of any Keynesian …scal policy that the industrial countries' large-scale asset purchase programs had hoped to achieve. Unfortunately, the same sort of boosting e¤ect did not happen in Western countries despite more mature and better-functioning markets and institutions. We argue that the key di¤erence is that China's stimulus programs are …scal in nature, whereas those in Western countries are almost purely monetary. 4 2 Although China's projected long-term GDP growth rate has fallen from 10% to around 7.5% or even lower since 2012, this is largely accounted for by the country's deliberate macro policy for a structural change of its growth model. Its central government acted swiftly to curtail public investment spending and luxury goods consumption in the wake of rapidly rising labor costs, corruption, and environmental problems. The structural adjustment aims to make China's economic growth more sustainable in the longer run. 3 Our arguments in this paper do not necessarily imply that SOEs per se are preferable. Rather, the crucial lesson learned from China is that …scal policies matter while purely monetary policies do not in eliminating a coordination-failure crisis. 4 The United States adopted both …scal and monetary stimulus programs. Its …scal package included the Economic Stimulus Act (ESA) of 2008 and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. The ESA was $152 billion (about 1 percent of GDP) and was used mainly to provide temporary tax relief for individuals and businesses. The ARRA totaled about $862 billion and was spread over 10 years (about 0.5 percent of GDP per year). The actual increase in government purchases of goods and services was even smaller. Using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Cogan and Taylor (2010) found that the government purchases through the 2nd quarter of 2010 has been only 2 percent of the ARRA (about $17 billion). They blame governments at the state and local levels for the failure to increase their purchases of goods and services (instead they reduced borrowing and increased transfer payments). Thus, the U.S. …scal stimulus packages were e¤ectively very small, in sharp contrast to its monetary stimulus packages: Total asset purchases were 8.7 percent of GDP between 2008 and 2010 and this value increased to about 22 percent 4 This paper also provides a theoretical model to rationalize the di¤erential impacts of …scal and monetary stimulus programs in China and other countries during the …nancial crisis.
Our model explains not only the two symptoms of the Great Recession, but also the key features of the Great Depression in the 1930s. Our model suggests that the Roosevelt New Deal policies implemented in 1933-34 and large military spending both before and during World War II may have played a pivotal role in the U.S. economy's full recovery in the 1940s, in terms of both growth rate and GDP level.
Our model is in spirit closely related to the model of Eggertsson and Krugman (EK, 2012) . EK provide a prototype dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with incomplete …nancial markets and debt constraints to show that a sudden reduction in debt limits triggered by a credit crunch can explain the Great Depression and some long-standing puzzles, such as debt de ‡ation and the liquidity trap, that often render monetary policies ine¤ective. In the EK model, because consumption demand depends on debt limits, a debt crisis can depress aggregate demand. Since debts are set in nominal terms, when the aggregate price falls, the real burden of the debt increases, further depressing consumption demand. Moving the economy away from the recessionary spiral requires a sharp reduction in the real interest rate to stimulate aggregate demand. However, if the nominal rate is already at its zero lower bound, further reduction in the real rate by expansionary monetary policies becomes impossible because of de ‡ation, thus making …scal policies the best alternative to reviving aggregate demand. 5 Our model complements the EK model in several important aspects: (i) Their model focuses on debts, whereas we focus on …xed production costs as an alternative mechanism for generating the liquidity trap and market-coordination failures. The need for an alternative mechanism is obvious because not all recessions are related to debt crises (such as the one experienced in China and Russia in 2008-09). (ii) In the EK model, recessions and underemployment are highly transitory phenomena; they occur only after a su¢ciently large exogenous shock to the debt limit and do not persist longer than the duration of the shocks. In contrast, recessions and underemployment in our model can be highly persistent because market-coordination failure is a Nash equilibrium in the model. Thus, our model can shed light on jobless recoveries and the persistence of recessions without relying on large exogenous and permanent shocks to debt limits, technologies, or preferences. (iii) EK do not model asset prices and capital accumulation; therefore, their model is silent on the long in 2013 (see, e.g., Fawley and Neely, 2013) .standing puzzle of high correlation between asset price crashes and high unemployment (as well as weak investment demand), which we argue are key for Keynes's (1936) analysis of recessions and economic recoveries based on …rms' animal spirits. 6 (iv) Finally, we provide an empirical case study for the e¤ectiveness of …scal stimulus programs in China during the worldwide Great Recession. Most economic activities involve …xed costs and such costs are substantial. For example, admistrative costs and sales expenses alone accounted for more than 10% of …rms' revenues betwen 2001 and 2010 in China, based on data of nearly 2000 listed …rms. 7 Indeed, …xed costs are perhaps one of the most important sources of non-convexities and increasing returns to scale, as well as the most important rationale for the existence of markups and …rms' motives for expanding market shares in a competitive world. Yet, an important but underappreciated economic property and macroeconomic implication of …xed costs is that it can lead to market-coordination failures and multiple equilibria.
Using a simple dynamic general equilibrium model, we show that requiring at least some …rms at some stages to pay for …xed costs of production is a surprisingly powerful assumption. Equilibrium with market-coordination failures, price and wage de ‡ations, stock market crashes, the liquidity trap, and a rationale for the positive role of …scal policies in economic crisis all emerge naturally from the model.
The intuition behind our results is simple. With …xed production costs, private …rms may opt to shut down production when anticipated prices (revenues) are too low to cover the …xed operation costs, thus triggering a reduction in investment and labor demand. In particular, pessimistic expectations of future demand will induce …rms to postpone investment, thus depressing demand for capital goods and forcing capital-goods producers to cut employment.
A reduction in employment will in turn depress wages and weaken aggregate consumption demand, which leads to a fall in aggregate prices, thus rectifying the …rms' initial pessimistic belief. At the same time, with anticipated low pro…ts and dividends, …rms' equity value in the stock market will crash. Once asset returns start to crumble, savers (consumers) opt to hoard cash instead of spending it. Monetary policies then become ine¤ective in boosting aggregate prices (demand). However, if there exist countercyclical …scal instruments, such as SOEs that can lean against the wind by committing to produce in recessions even with negative pro…ts, dramatic falls in aggregate demand and prices can be stopped. Consequently, expansionary monetary policy can start working to push up commodity and asset prices to restore the 6 See, e.g., Farmer (2012 Farmer ( , 2013 . 7 See Section 3 for details.
6 full-employment equilibrium, thanks to the initiative of counter-cyclical …scal policies.
Thus, viewed through the lens of our model, the stubborn persistence of un(der)employment (or the jobless recoveries) in the United States and Europe during the many years after the …nancial crisis are attributable to market-coordination failures and the inability of their governments to implement aggressive expansionary …scal policies. In particular, our model suggests that monetary policies alone are insu¢cient to end the Great Recession, thus explaining why so many European nations even today (10 years after the crisis) are still engaged in low or even negative nominal interest rates (see Dong and Wen, 2017; Reinbold and Wen, 2017 8 In other words, to avoid a jobless recovery or a permanent below-trend output level after a recession, an economy needs a temporary boost in growth rate, or a "growthovershooting" period in which the growth rate of output exceeds its average long-run rate.
Consider two hypothetical output levels of two countries, say China (red solid line in Figure 1A ) and the United States (blue solid line in Figure 1A ), with the former growing faster than the latter. The slopes of the two solid lines in Figure 1A represent the growth rate of output in the two countries; these are recaptured in Figure 1B (i.e., the two lines in Figure 1B are simply the respective slopes of the two solid lines in Figure 1A ). Both countries experienced an unexpected recession in period t, at which point their respective growth rate fall below their pre-crisis (long-run) growth rates-say China's growth rate falls from 10% to 6% and the U.S. growth rate falls from 2% to -2%, so both countries su¤ered a 4-percentage-point drop in growth rate. Also, both countries are able to resume (recover) their respective pre-crisis growth after the recession ends in period t + 1. However, a critical di¤erence is that the growth rate of the United States recovers through a V-shaped growth path (blue line in Figure 1B ), whereas that in China recovers through an inverted Z-shaped growth path (red line in Figure 1B ). That is, China's growth rate overshoots its pre-crisis growth rate temporarily during the recovery period and reaches a rate of 14% per year in period t + 1 before resuming its 10% per year long-run rate after t + 1. This subtle di¤erence in the pattern of growth rate implies that the GDP level in China is able to fully revert to its long-run path (red solid line A in Figure 1A) , whereas the GDP level in the United States becomes permanently lower than its original long-run path (blue solid line B in Figure 1A ). Figure 1A . Hypothetical GDP Levels. Figure 1B . Hypothetical Growth Rates.
Since output is produced by labor, a permanent loss in GDP level implies a permanently lower employment rate-or equivalently, a "jobless recovery." Thus, the two panels in Figure   1 illustrate two di¤erences, one important and one trivial, between the U.S. experience and 8 the Chinese experience: (i) The trivial di¤erence is that the United States has a negative growth rate of -2% during the recession period, while China has a positive growth rate of 6% during the same period. But this di¤erence is meaningless with regard to whether a country will experience a jobless recovery.
(ii) The important di¤erence is that the United States has taken path B (solid blue line) in Figure 1A without undergoing the Z-shaped growthcorrection period. The United States could have followed a di¤erent path after the recession (as indicated by the dashed blue line A in Figure 1A) , and China could have followed a jobless recovery path (as indicated by the dashed red line B in Figure 1A) .
Therefore, what is important for a full recovery in the GDP level is that the economy's temporary drop in growth rate in a recession needs to be fully compensated by a temporary above-average growth rate during the recovery period, so as to fully o¤set the permanent loss of output caused by the slower growth in the recession period. In the …gures, we assumed that China managed to temporarily overshoot its long-run growth rate during the recovery period, whereas the United States only managed to resume its long-run growth rate without such growth overshooting. Consequently, even though both countries eventually recovered their respective long-run growth rate after the crisis (as Figure 1B shows), only China was able to return to its long-run output level (the solid red line A in Figure 1A ), while the United States resumed only its long-run growth rate but not its GDP level (as indicated by the solid blue line B in Figure 1A ). The following subsections document that this scenario is exactly what happened in the two countries during the recent …nancial crisis.
E¤ectiveness of Stimulus Packages
As noted in the literature (e.g., IMF, 2010; International Institute for Labour Studies, 2011;
Aiginger, 2011), with similar magnitude and timing the stimulus packages were much more e¤ective in China in boosting economic performances than in the United States and Europe.
The most apparent evidence comes from the direct comparison of real GDP in China with its U.S. and European Union (EU) counterparts before and after the crisis. Figure 2 shows the real log GDP levels for the three economies (solid vertical bars in top panels) and the projected GDP long-run trends (dashed lines in top panels), which are estimated based on each economy's average growth rate in the pre-crisis period (i.e., between 1998 and 2007). 9 The lower panels in Figure 2 overshot or temporarily rose above their pre-crisis rates in the recovery period. This means that the output losses caused by the slower growth rate during the …nancial crisis have not been fully compensated by a higher-than-normal growth rate since the crisis, leading to the permanently lower level of GDP shown in the top-middle and top-right windows in Figure   2 .
One may argue that China was not hit as hard by the …nancial crisis as Western countries because China's …nancial system was not well entangled with the international …nancial system. However, China's economy was much less stable than those of industrial countries where the dashed line is projection based on the pre-crisis growth trend as in Figure 2 ).
Since total exports accounted for 38% of China's GDP in early 2007, everything else equal, a permanent 45% drop in total exports would have reduced China's GDP level permanently by 17% below its potential trend.
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An important feature of the …nancial crisis is that it a¤ected not only countries with close …nancial links to the United States but also countries without, such as countries that depend heavily on world trade. For example, member countries of the BRICS, such as Russia and South Africa, though not as closely linked to the U.S. …nancial system as Europe but have a relatively large export sector (like China), su¤ered large permanent losses in GDP.
Speci…cally, in 2007, the share of exports in GDP was 30% for Russia and 31% for South Africa (compared with 38% in China). The …nancial crisis caused a 49% permanent drop in total exports in Russia and a 19% permanent drop in South Africa (middle and right panels in Figure 3 ). Consequently, these two countries also su¤ered large permanent GDP lossesthe real GDP level has dropped 23% below potential trend for Russia and 8% for South Africa (top panels in Figure 4 ). The bottom panels in Figure The economic performances in BRICS countries during the …nancial crisis are consistent with the prediction of the textbook Keynesian multiplier theory. In 2007, the share of total exports in GDP was 13% for Brazil, 30% for Russia, 20% for India, 38% for China, and 31%
for South Africa. All of these countries have su¤ered sharp declines in real exports since the crisis-by 2011, real exports in these countries still stood at 17%, 49%, 6.5%, 44% and 19%, respectively, below their respective long-run trends. Suppose the demand multiplier is 1.5
for each country, then without government interventions such sharp and permanent declines in exports would have caused a permanent drop in the GDP level of 3.4% for Brazil, 22.3%
for Russia, 2% for India, 25.3% for China, and 9% for South Africa. In fact, the actual GDP gap by the end of 2011 was 2.9% in Brazil, 23.1% in Russia, 0.8% in India, 2.7% in China, and 8.3% in South Africa. Therefore, except for China, the predicted GDP gaps based on the multiplier principle are consistent with the actual estimated GDP gaps (Table 1) . Table 1 . It shows that the predicted GDP gaps based on the multiplier principle match the data quite well for Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa. The predicted gap (horizontal axes) and the actual gap (vertical axes) form almost a 45-degree line for these countries, suggesting that even without tight …nancial links to the United States, a developing country's decline in GDP after the crisis is closely linked to its decline in exports multiplied by the initial share of exports in GDP before the crisis. The multiplier of 1.5 simply suggests that the demand-side e¤ect of trade collapse is ampli…ed universally across these developing countries with a similar multiplier.
China is a surprising outlier in Figure 5 . The multiplier principle predicts that China's GDP level would be 25% below potential trend, given its large (nearly 40%) export share in GDP and nearly 45% permanent decline in total exports (i.e., 0:38 0:44 1:5 = 0:25). Therefore, the only important and relevant question is "why did a growth-correction (or growth-overshooting) recovery period occur in China but not in the United States, Europe, Russia, and South Africa?" Table 2 sheds some light on this question by looking at the decomposed contributions of the four major components of aggregate demand (private consumption, government spending, aggregate …xed investment of private and public sectors, and net exports) to GDP growth in China, the United States, and Europe. Table 2 in that year, far larger than the negative contribution from private consumption. In fact, weak investment demand was not only the culprit in the Great Recession but also key in the U.S. jobless recovery in the post-crisis period. The situation in Europe was quite similar:
The sharp decline in …xed investment was the single most important contributor to Europe's negative GDP growth during the crisis period, representing more than 87% of the negative income growth in 2009, which was more than 4 times the negative contribution from private consumption (see Table 2 ).
Therefore, the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy was dramatically di¤erent between China and the industrial economies. As the …rst central bank reacting to the …nancial crisis, the Fed started massive monetary injection as early as 2008:Q3. The total monetary base has more than doubled within two years, making it the single most aggressive monetary injection in U.S. history. In addition, the Fed conducted unconventional monetary policies through largescale asset purchases to lower the longer-term interest rate. By 2013, total long-term asset purchases reached $3.5 trillion, equivalent to 21% of U.S. GDP. However, banks responded by increasing excess reserves rather than increasing bank loans, and the public responded with a substantial ‡ight to liquidity in the form of currency and demand deposits. So the dramatic monetary easing did not translate into increases in credit expansion in the United
States; instead, the real growth rate of outstanding loan balances was negative in 2009 and 2010. As a result, the growth rate of credit lending was 15 percentage points below its pre-crisis average level despite the unprecedented monetary injections (left panel in Figure   6 ). Europe faced a similar dilemma (middle panel in Figure 6 ), although the magnitudes of both monetary injection and loan balance shrinkage were relatively smaller than those in the United States. Why did monetary policies fail in boosting aggregate demand in the United States and Europe while they succeeded in China? The next section reveals the answers.
Contribution of SOEs to China's Economic Recovery
Further investigation shows that the e¤ectiveness of China's stimulus packages is derived from the contribution of the public sector (SOEs). We start with …rms' borrowing behaviors, which is essential in understanding the e¤ectiveness of China's …scal/monetary policies.
Since information on the breakdown of outstanding loan balances according to borrowers' ownership is currently unavailable, we choose to explore the issue indirectly by focusing on the manufacturing …rms' average leverage ratio published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). Although the leverage ratio in the pre-crisis period was similar between SOEs (58.5%) and POEs (59.1%), the dynamic paths during the stimulus period were quite di¤erent for these two groups ( Figure 7A , where the dashed lines represents the pre-crisis average levels in each panel). On the one hand, the average leverage ratio of state- higher SOE shares in total regional output (or employment) to su¤er less and recover faster from the crisis.
To con…rm this conjecture, we run the following regression:
where denotes the …rst-di¤erence operator; GDP j;t is the provincial output level (in logarithm) in province j and period t; X t is the STIMULUS dummy variable for the stimulus period (i.e., 2009 and 2010); Z j;t is a proxy of the share of SOEs in province j in period t; and e j;t is an error term. The province …xed e¤ects ( j;t ) are introduced to capture any unobserved attributes such as natural resource endowments across provinces, with the assumption that these factors would not substantially change within a short time period (such as the stimulus period). If SOEs have made major contributions to the e¤ectiveness of the stimulus package, the coe¢cient should be positive and statistically signi…cant. Bear in mind that our model does not capture any cross-border spillover e¤ects-because of input-output and trade linkages across provinces, a higher SOE share in province A may also boost output in province B. Thus, there may be downward bias in the estimated coe¢cient.
The estimation results are listed in Table 3 . As a benchmark speci…cation, column (1) strictly follows equation (1) . The coe¢cient of the STIMULUS dummy X is signi…cantly negative, while the coe¢cient of the cross term between X and the SOE share variable Z is positive and signi…cant at the 10% level. These two coe¢cients together suggest that while the economic growth in all provinces was signi…cantly negatively a¤ected by the crisis, provinces with more SOEs su¤ered less and recovered faster from the crisis, which is consistent with our expectation. Calculating based on the coe¢cients and controlling for other factors, during the stimulus period the real annual GDP growth rate (at the province level)
with the highest SOE share would be about 1:87 percentage points higher than that in the province with the lowest SOE share.
The following columns in Table 3 Finally, in the last three columns we introduce the lagged level of GDP as an additional control variable for each of the three cases, which does not a¤ect the results signi…cantly.
In Table 4 we adopt the growth rate of total …xed investment in each province as the dependent variable, with the explanatory variables identical to those in Table 3 . Again, the interaction term between the SOE proxy and the STIMULUS dummy is signi…cantly positive in the model, suggesting that provinces with a higher SOE shares also experienced a larger expansion in …xed investment during the stimulus period. According to the coe¢cients in column (1), during the stimulus period the real annual growth rate of …xed investment is or above 2 million yuan RMB. 13 We exclude from our sample all the SOEs with annual sales lower than 2 million yuan RMB to make the two types of …rms comparable. As a result, we have a total of 328,236 …rms (including 8,011 SOEs and 320,225 non-SOEs) with 871,913 …rm-year observations.
We run the following regressions to investigate SOEs' responses to the stimulus package in terms of the changes in their …xed investment and debts during the crisis period:
where denotes the …rst-di¤erence operator; P P E i;t is the book value of plant, property and equipment (or the so-called …xed assets according to China's accounting code) owned by …rm i at the end of year t (normalized by the …rm's total asset in the same point), DEBT i;t is the book value of debt held by …rm i at the end of year t (again normalized by the total asset); X t is the dummy variable for the stimulus period (i.e., 2009 and 2010), and SOE i is the dummy variable for SOEs; i and t are the …rm-and year …xed e¤ects, respectively, which are introduced to capture any unobserved …rm attributes or macro conditions; Z i;t refer to other control variables such as pro…tability; and " i;t is an error term. All variables are winsorized at 1% in order to exclude the e¤ect of outliers. The summary statistics of the variables are listed in Table 5 . Everything else equal, if SOEs have made major contributions to the e¤ectiveness of the aggregate stimulus package, the coe¢cient should be positive and statistically signi…cant in the above two models. The estimation results are presented in Table 6 . Regarding the …rms' …xed asset investment growth, column (1) shows that is positive and signi…cant at the 1% level. The magnitude of suggests that the normalized growth rate of …xed asset investment of the state-owned industrial enterprises is about 1:5 percentage points higher than the non-SOE counterparts during the stimulus period. This suggests that, while …rms were reluctant to invest in …xed assets during the crisis, the SOEs did the opposite and invested signi…cantly more than private …rms, which is consistent with our expectation. 13 See Brandt, Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012) and Cai and Liu (2009) for more details on CASIF. exports collapsed, SOEs in China borrowed more, invested more, and produced more, which revived the private sector and generated a sharp and prompt recovery of aggregate demand. 14 The results are consistent in a series of robustness checks, although we do not report them here to conserve space. First, instead of using the whole decade between 2001 and 2010, we tried using the period of 2007-2010 only (i.e., with two years before the stimulus period and two years during the stimulus period), and the results are robust. Second, instead of using all non-SOEs as the control group, we tried narrowing down to the …rms which are explicitly labelled as private …rms (i.e., we exclude the joint ventures whose ownership structures are not clear). Again the results are consistent. We also tried adopting a strictly balanced panel, which does not quantitatively a¤ect the results either.
These …ndings naturally lead to the question of why SOEs could play such a critical role, given that SOEs are generally considered or perceived as highly ine¢cient. We answer this question with a theoretical model developed in the next section.
The Benchmark Model
We present …rst some empirical evidence on …xed costs and then a simple benchmark model without labor (and with a constant aggregate supply of capital) to illustrate several key properties of our model. These key properties include: (i) stock market crashes and high unemployment can go hand in hand (see Farmer, 2012 and ; (ii) a jobless recovery with permanently lower output level can be a self-ful…lling market-coordination-failure equilibrium; (iii) monetary policies alone are insu¢cient to lift the economy out of the market-coordination-failure trap; and (iv) …scal policies are a powerful tool to address the coordination-failure problem. We then extend the simple model to a more general setting with active capital accumulation, endogenous labor supply, and SOE …rms to show how SOEs can help withstand the market-coordination-failure trap.
Empirical Evidence. Since the key assumption in our model to deliver the essential results is …xed cost in production, we …rst provide some evidence on the size of …xed costs in China to support our model. Following the in ‡uential work of Melitz (2003) , we use …rms' …xed overhead (operation) costs as a proxy for …xed production costs.
According to the accounting code in China, …xed overhead costs include four major components reported in …rms' income statements, namely, (i) depreciation costs of …xed assets, (ii) …xed …nancial costs, (iii) administrative expenses, and (iv) sales expenses. Unlike the variable costs of raw materials and labor, these costs do not vary with the amount of output produced each period on a daily basis. Table 7 reports the share of the 4 types of …xed costs in …rms' total assets, based on the annual …nancial statements, where the last column is …rm's asset returns. The upper panel (A) reports results based total of 2952 …rms listed in mainland China. During the decade of 2001-2010, the total value of these four components, normalized by each …rm's total assets, ‡uctuated around 15%. Even if we take out capital depreciation (…rst column), the reaming …xed costs still account for more than 12% of …rms' total assets on average.
The results are similar if we focus on the 1777 listed …rms in the manufacturing industry only (Panel B). The lower panel in Table 7 shows that the average …xed costs are about 15%-18% of …rms assets. Taking out depreciation cost, the remaining …xed costs still account for 25 11%-15% of …rm assets. Since in China the average asset-to-output ratio is around 1, these values reported in Table 7 also re ‡ect the ratio of …xed costs-to-output (annual sales).
Hence, the share of …xed costs in …rms' output (revenue) is substantial, much higher than the average rate of return to assets (the last column in Table 7 indicates a 4%-5% rate of return on average). Hence, when market demand is in slump, sales would be too low to cover these …xed costs of operations, …rms may opt to shut down production, as formally shown in our model.
Households. There is a representative household that chooses consumption and …rm equity shares to solve
such that
where the constant > 0 in the utility function represents consumption of non-market goods, which serves to bound the marginal utility of consumption away from negative in…nity when the consumption for market goods collapses to C t = 0. 15 P t is the …nal good price, Q it is the competitive price of intermediate-goods …rm i's equity, s it is the equity share of …rm i held by the household, d it is dividends of …rm i, and t is total pro…t income of the …nal-good …rm.
Denoting f t ; c t g as the Lagrangian multipliers for equations (5) and (6), the …rst-order conditions (FOCs) for fC t ; s it+1 g are given by
Equation (8) implies that the equity price Q it is simply the present value of discounted future dividends:
The Final-Good Firm. There is a representative …nal-good producer that produces the …nal consumption good Y t by combining intermediate goods Y it :
where > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods. Denoting the price of the …nal good by P t and that of intermediate goods by P it , pro…t maximization leads to the following demand function for intermediate good i:
We choose the …nal good price as the numeraire; thus,
Intermediate-Goods Producers. There is a continuum of monopolistic …rms indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. Firm i produces intermediate good i using capital only, and the production technology is given by
where e it 2 [0; 1] denotes the rate of capacity utilization. Assume that in each period there exist …xed costs of production > 0, measured in terms of the …nal good, and that the …xed cost is identical across …rms. 16 The revenue of an intermediate-good …rm is then given by
where 1 it is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if e it > 0 and 0 if e it = 0.
Each intermediate-good …rm i chooses capacity utilization rate e t (i) and investment
I t (i) to maximize the value of the …rm (the present value of discounted future dividends),
P it+j e it+j K it+j 1 it+j P I t+j I it+j , or solve the following recursive problem:
subject to
and e it 2 [0; 1], with K i0 > 0 given.
Denoting q it as the Lagrangian multiplier for equation (17) , the FOCs for fI it ; e it ; K it+1 g are given by
16 Making the …xed cost heterogeneous does not change our results. 17 Firms do not incur the …xed costs if they do not produce in period t.
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Tobin's q is given by or future capacity utilization rates are positive in some periods.
The aggregate supply of capital is …xed:
We can interpret the capital as Lucas trees. Firms can purchase Lucas trees to yield fruits and accumulate more trees from the asset market if pro…table. It takes one period to yield fruits after purchase. However, operating Lucas trees is costly: The cost is > 0. An immediate implication of this …xed cost is that even if the Lucas trees are free (i.e., P I t = 0), the market demand for such assets can still be zero (I it = 0 for all i) if the expected pro…ts (under full-capacity utilization) are negative:
Rational Expectations Equilibrium. We consider symmetric equilibrium with K it = K, I it = I t , e it = e t , d it = D t , q it = q t , Q it = Q t , and P it = P t = 1. A rational expectations equilibrium is de…ned as the sequence of asset prices q t ; Q t ; P Proposition 1 For a su¢ciently high aggregate capital stock K > , the model has at least two rational expectations equilibria: (i) a Keynesian equilibrium with market-coordination failures, where the quantities for market activities fY t ; e t ; C t g = 0 and prices q t ; Q t ; P I t = 0; and (ii) a classic equilibrium with full-capacity utilization e = 1, positive quantities fY; Cg > 0, and positive prices q; Q; P I > 0. For convenience, we call the classical equilibrium a "full-employment equilibrium" even though there is no labor in the model yet.
Proof. See Appendix I.
In the Keynesian equilibrium, every market participant is worse o¤ than in the classical equilibrium; however, no individuals have incentives to deviate away from the coordinationfailure equilibrium because (i) it is not optimal for any single intermediate-good …rm to produce when other intermediate-goods …rms are not producing; (ii) it is impossible for consumers to increase consumption when their wealth income (stock price and equity value) is zero; and (iii) it is not optimal for …rms to increase asset demand when there is no demand for their output and households do not consume. Therefore, consumers and producers are trapped in the coordination-failure equilibrium because none of them has the incentive to increase e¤orts to boost demand/supply on their part even though they have the ability to do so collectively through coordinated actions. Suppose all producers could act together to increase capital investment with "animal spirits"; asset prices and household wealth would go up and consequently consumption would also go up, so the economy could escape from the coordination-failure equilibrium. Alternatively, suppose all consumers would increase consumption; intermediate-goods prices P it would go up and it would then become pro…table for …rms to produce and invest. But individual consumers and …rms, by rationally making decisions based on their own self-interests, are unable to coordinate their actions to end the recession. capacity utilization rate, and s denotes the saving rate. Since output cannot be negative, the production frontier is Y = max ff (e K) c; 0g. As Figure 8 shows, the …xed cost of production (c) makes the zero-output steady state (point A) a stable steady state since …rms will opt not to produce if K < f 1 (c). But this zero-output steady state is not yet a Nash equilibrium since the economy can growth out of it once the capital stock is large enough. However, with variable capacity utilization, forward-looking investment decisions and a wealth e¤ect from dynamic asset prices, the zero-output steady state with e = 0 can become a self-ful…lling Nash equilibrium even if the economy is already at point B or the capital stock is already su¢ciently large with K > f 1 (c). That is, a market economy operating at the full-capacity utilization equilibrium B may suddenly collapse to equilibrium A with permanently lower output and employment.
A More General Model
This section introduces labor, money, and reproducible capital into the benchmark model.
For simplicity, we use the money-in-the-utility model (as in Lucas, 2000) . However, since money is a veil (without sticky prices), it has no e¤ects on equilibrium allocations and the results would thus be identical regardless of money. To make the monetary model more interesting, we assume that the …xed costs of production are in nominal terms so that money is not neutral. We show that even with monetary non-neutrality, expansionary monetary policy cannot by itself be e¤ective in preventing recessions or resolving coordination failures.
Instead, …scal policies matter.
Firms' Problem
The Capital-Good Producer. There is a representative capital-goods supplier that uses labor only to produce capital, which is sold to intermediate-goods producers as inputs. The production technology is given by
so a representative …rm solves
where P I denotes the nominal price of the capital good. Optimal production (supply of capital good I s t ) and demand for labor are given, respectively, by
where I An intermediate-goods …rm chooses capacity utilization rate e t (i) and investment in …xed capital I t (i) to maximize the value of the …rm:
subject to the demand function (16) and
e it 2 [0; 1], and K i0 > 0 given, where the constraint (27) re ‡ects the assumption that investment is irreversible. Irreversible investment simpli…es our analysis by increasing the tractability of the general model. It also reinforces the stability of the Keynesian equilibrium. The intuition is that investment by nature is a forward-looking behavior, whereas capacity utilization is not, and irreversible investment creates a state of rational inaction when the future is uncertain and gloomy. Because waiting has positive option value when …rms are uncertain about future demand, they opt not to undertake investment under pessimistic expectations even though the current demand may be high, so a wait-and-see position or strategy becomes optimal.
Low investment demand imposes a negative demand externality on capital-goods producers and their employment decisions, reinforcing any pessimistic expectations about aggregate demand. Denoting fq it ; it g as the Lagrangian multipliers for equations (26) and (27), respectively, the FOCs for fI it ; e it ; K it+1 g are given by
which are analogous to those in the benchmark model. Because producing investment goods is subject to diminishing returns to scale in the capital-good-producing sector, the equilibrium investment in the intermediate-goods sector is always …nite (bounded above) for any bounded prices P it Pt 2 [0; 1) despite the linear technology in the …nal-good sector. However, investment remains a jump variable except that it is bound below by zero as a result of the irreversibility assumption.
Household Problem
With labor and money added into the general model, the household problem becomes
where t is nominal pro…t income from capital-good-producing …rms. 19 Denoting N t as the Lagrangian multiplier for equation (34) and keeping the same notations for the remaining Lagrangian multipliers as in the benchmark model, the FOCs of the household become 18 Adopting a more general leisure cost function, such as a
, has no qualitative e¤ects on our results. 19 The pro…t of the …nal-good sector is zero and is thus not included to simplify notations. 33 
Proof. See Appendix II.
Note that in the Keynesian equilibrium, there is negative in ‡ation, so the real rate of return to money is strictly positive. As a result, the real money demand lim t!1
which is the liquidity trap equilibrium. Also note that even if the nominal wage is sticky such that
Wt Pt
does not approach zero, the Keynesian equilibrium still exists because capital producers have no incentive to hire labor when the real wage
is high yet the output (investment good) price
is zero. Thus, consumers' labor income remains zero regardless of sticky wages. In this sticky wage case, we may have involuntary unemployment with
Carollary 1 In normal times, money is a lubricant of the economy and is non-neutral.
First, because the …xed cost is nominal, the higher the price level, the lower the real …xed cost. Second, and more importantly, if the aggregate stock of money supply M is too low ( M < 1 K M ), then it cannot support a full-employment equilibrium;
instead the Keynesian equilibrium is the only equilibrium. Thus, a sharp contraction in the money supply from a level above M to a level below M can push the economy from the full-employment equilibrium to the Keynesian equilibrium (i.e., monetary contraction and de ‡ation are bad and dangerous). The reverse, however, is not true.
Expansionary monetary policy cannot automatically shift the economy from the Keynesian equilibrium to the classical equilibrium because restoring the full-employment equilibrium also requires a shift of expectations (coordination by all economic agents).
Corollary 1 provides a theoretical rationale for the Friedman-Schwartz (1963) hypothesis that monetary contraction by the Fed during the early 1930s caused the Great Depression.
Note that de ‡ation exacerbates the …xed cost problem because the real …xed cost Pt goes to in…nity over time as the aggregate price level falls. This situation is similar to the Fisherian debt-de ‡ation problem studied by Eggertson and Krugman (2012).
When aggregate demand collapses, the price system collapses too-welcome to the Keynesian world where classical theory is turned upside down and no longer applies. In other words, despite zero prices with unemployed resources, no market mechanisms can help re-establish trade. Therefore, traditional monetary injection cannot eliminate the market-coordination failure equilibrium even if money supply is plentiful. The large-scale asset purchase programs conducted by the Fed since the …nancial crisis cannot do the job either because merely preventing asset prices (or the price of Lucas trees) from falling does not help when nobody wants to hold the assets that are no longer productive. Preventing the nominal wage from falling (such as the policy adopted by the Hoover administration during the Great Depression) does not help either because the problem is not the lack of labor supply but the lack of labor demand. The best hope to solve the coordination-failure problem with a collapsed aggregate demand, as Keynes (1936) argued, is to use government spending to support aggregate demand, thus restoring the price system and reviving the aggregate supply. 20 
Withstanding Coordination Failures: Keynesianism, Chinese Style
China has a dual-track system that features the co-existence of SOEs and POEs. The dual-track system was originally designed by the Chinese government in the early stage of economic reform to provide two important functions:
(i) to prevent a sharp rise in unemployment caused by the reform by maintaining a stable labor demand in the public sector (Lin et al., 1998) , which is equivalent to an implicit lump-sum transfer from the winners (bene…ciaries) of the reform (workers in the private sector) to the losers of the reform (workers in the public sector) so as to avoid social instability (Lau, Qian, and Roland, 2000) ; and 20 Our model thus also implies that …scal stimulus programs that rely heavily on tax reliefs and transfer payments to households (such as the ESA in 2008 and ARRA in 2009) are not as e¤ective as direct increases in government spending on goods and services due to the Ricardian equivalence principle. In addition, a tax cut is equivalent to an increase in …rms' output price, while transfer payments to households are equivalent to decreases in consumption-goods price (or increases in workers' wage). According to our theoretical model, these measures cannot insulate the economy from the Keynesian equilibrium because they tend to work through the price system, but the price system has already collapsed in a coordination-failure equilibrium. The key, therefore, is to use government spending to support quantities (aggregate demand) instead of prices.
(ii) to provide economic and political insurance against possible failures of the reform under epic uncertainty of the outcome of the reform. 21 The basic motive for the reform was clearly to address the ine¢ciency problem of SOEs.
But the private sector's ability to absorb surplus labor is limited by its …nite rate of growth.
Hence, China's gradualist reform through the dual-track system is coined "a reform without losers" (Lau, Qian, and Roland, 2000) . Our model shows that this type of …scal-plus-monetary policy mix or "dual-dose" stimulus package is a desirable policy combination that can provide not only a precautionary double insurance of success, but also a necessary and su¢cient condition for avoiding a de ‡ationary deep recession.
The intuition is that on the one hand, without encouraging the SOEs to continue to operate under negative pro…ts (the …scal package), a monetary injection would be impossible or insu¢cient to address the coordination-failure problem. Ironically, such a policy cannot stop de ‡ation despite unprecedented monetary injections. On the other hand, without an expansionary monetary policy to accompany the …scal stimulus package, SOEs may continue to operate under negative pro…ts with the …scal stimulus program in place (due to insu¢ciently high aggregate price levels), which is not optimal and is unsustainable.
This section introduces a public sector into the benchmark model to support these arguments. We study how the dual-dose government stimulus program, which requires (i) the public track to expand production and increase investment on the one hand and (ii) the central bank to increase money supply on the other hand, can prevent a severe coordination failure and a deep recession when hit by a unprecedented negative shock to aggregate demand (say net exports).
The Final-Good Producer. There are two types of …rms in the economy, SOEs and POEs, denoted by h = fP OE; SOEg. A representative …rm produces the …nal consumption good Y t by combining intermediate goods Y it produced by POEs and SOEs: 
where Denoting the price of the …nal good by P t and that of intermediate goods by P h it , where h = fP OE; SOEg, pro…t maximization leads to the following demand function for intermediate good i:
Intermediate-Goods Firms. There are two types of …rms in the intermediate-goods
sector indexed by h 2 fSOE; P OEg. Part of the production technology is identical for the two types of …rms,
However, assume that the …xed cost of production is higher for SOEs than for POEs with SOE > P OE > 0:
This assumption implies that SOEs are less e¢cient than POEs. Firm i of type h solves
subject to 
The Capital-Good Firm. A representative capital-good producer chooses employment to maximize pro…ts P 
The Household. A representative household solves
The …rst-order conditions are given by
Note that if SOEs are less e¢cient because of higher …xed production costs, they will pay lower dividends to households than POEs. However, this does not necessarily imply that the demand for equity shares of SOEs is zero, because a lower dividend does not imply a lower rate of return to equities, which is given by the dividend-to-price ratio
In particular, the dividend-to-price ratio
= 1 + r in the steady state, so it is independent of dividends and …rm types in this model. Therefore, as long as SOEs can pay positive dividends, households will hold the equities of both SOEs and POEs. . Suppose that the SOE sector can commit to producing output regardless of pro…ts and that monetary policy is accommodative with an adequate money supply; then the fullemployment equilibrium is the only equilibrium and, at this equilibrium, both SOEs and POEs can make positive pro…ts.
Proof. See Appendix III.
The key intuition is that the existence of SOEs can prevent aggregate demand from collapsing, thereby making money injections e¤ective in raising aggregate prices, and thus not only preventing economic meltdown but also keeping all …rms pro…table. The public sector is pro…t-driven in normal times when the private sector (market) is functioning properly, albeit less e¢ciently than the private sector. But when the private sector is about to collapse (or has collapsed) due to pessimistic expectations of future market sales, the public sector can maintain its operations and defy the self-ful…lling expectations of the private sector (or revive the private sector even if it has collapsed). This means that as long as the public sector is in operation, the Keynesian equilibrium can no longer be possible or self-ful…lling despite large exogenous shocks to the economy.
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Conclusion
This paper provides a case study for the sharp di¤erences in the e¤ectiveness of stimulus packages in combating the …nancial crisis in the industrial world and in China. We attempt to explain why the industrial world entered a long period of recession (jobless recovery) with large permanent losses in GDP following the crisis, whereas China resumed its long-run growth path shortly after the shock with only minor and temporary losses in GDP despite the global trade collapse. We argue that a key di¤erence between China's stimulus package and the Western stimulus packages is that the Chinese package is …scal in nature whereas those in industrial countries are monetary in nature. We then also provide a theoretical model to rationalize the empirical evidence and support our arguments.
China may be lucky to have had a large enough SOE sector available at the onset of the …nancial crisis to help defend its economy from a crushing slowdown. 22 The crucial lesson learned from China is not necessarily that SOEs per se are desirable, but rather that credible …scal policies matter in eliminating a coordination-failure crisis, 22 In industrial countries, even if governments are willing and able to increase expenditures to stimulate the economy, it takes time and e¤ort to identify shovel-ready projects at a critical moment when immediate actions are needed. The Chinese government solved the identi…cation problem of …nding immediate shovelready projects by using the SOEs. That is, because SOEs exist, identifying shovel-ready projects is not an issue in China. 40 whereas purely monetary (or half-hearted …scal) policies do not. We believe that the inability to implement aggressive and decisive …scal policies in Western countries explains the stubborn persistence of the Great Recession in the United States and jobless recoveries in Europe, in contrast to the rapid economic recovery in China after the global …nancial crisis as well as the Great Recovery in the United States (in the 1930s-40s) following the Great Depression.
Appendix I. Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. First, consider the full-employment equilibrium.
Suppose the demand for intermediate goods is expected to be su¢ciently high that revenues can cover the …xed costs of production under full capacity utilization, P it K it > ; then the FOCs of the intermediate-goods …rms imply e it = 1. The marginal product of capital is given by
in the steady state. Equation (20) implies that the asset price of Lucas trees is
The aggregate dividends of the intermediate-goods …rms are D t = K > 0, the household's share of …rms' equity s it = 1 for all i in equilibrium, so the household budget constraint becomes (note aggregate
The steady-state value of the …rm is given by
which is also the share price Q.
Now consider the coordination-failure Keynesian equilibrium.
Suppose that the intermediate-goods …rms are pessimistic about their future demand because consumption demand on the …nal good Y is su¢ciently low, and thus they expect the revenue to be unable to cover the …xed cost of production and investment expenditures from period t on (even at full-capacity utilization): P it+j K it+j < for j 0. 23 This means that the value of the …rm would be negative if it continues to operate, thus setting e it+j = 0 and I it+j = 0 for all periods j 0 is optimal. Equation (20) can be written as 23 We treat the equality P i K i = as a borderline case.
44 which implies that all …rms' asset prices q it collapse to zero immediately in period t when the expected ‡ow of future dividends is choked o¤, P it+j e it+j K it+j 1 it+j = 0 for all j > 0.
Namely, given any price of investment good P I t , the value of newly installed capital is given by q t = 0; hence, the intermediate-goods …rms will not undertake any investment, thus opting to set I t+j = 0 for all j 0. Without e¤ective investment demand in the present and the future, the asset price P I t will decrease to zero. 24 Since the …rm value (stock price) collapses to zero with
the household's budget constraint then implies that aggregate consumption demand is zero from period t on. Thus, …rms' initial pessimistic expectation about consumption demand is self-ful…lled. That is, not undertaking any investment on the …rm side (because of a pessimistic view of the future) can crash consumption demand by choking o¤ household wealth. Thus, the household budge constraint collapses to zero:
which is consistent with the goods-market clearing condition:
Appendix II. Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. Consider the full-employment equilibrium …rst. Suppose
or equivalently P t = P > K for all t, then e = 1,
,
and C = K P . Since C > 0 and N > 0, we must have c = N = 0. Equation (38) implies (1 )
Equations (35) and (36) imply 24 Since the zero investment demand is caused by q t = 0, we have that q t approaches zero before (or faster than) P 
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The steady-state capital stock K is determined by the following equation:
where the last equality is obtained by using equation (63). Equation (65) pessimistic about current and future aggregate consumption demand, e.g., Y is su¢ciently low, and thus they expect the revenue
is not able to cover the …xed cost of production and investment expenditures from period t on (even at full-capacity utilization): P it+j K it+j < for j 0. This means that the value of the …rm would be negative if it continues to operate, thus setting e it+j = 0 and I it+j = 0 for all future periods j 0 is optimal. Equation (30) can be written as
which implies that the …rm asset prices q it collapse to zero immediately in period t when expected ‡ow of future dividends is choked o¤. Namely, given any real price of investment good P I t Pt , the real value of newly installed capital is given by q t = 0. Hence, the intermediategoods …rms will not undertake any investment, thus opting to set I t+j = 0 for all j 0.
Without e¤ective investment demand in the present and the future, the real capital-goods price P I t Pt will collapse too. 25 With the asset prices q t+j = 0 for all j 0, equation (18) implies that the multiplier t+j approaches zero from above: lim j!1 t+j = lim j!1 P I t+j P t+j = 0, which is consistent with I t+j = 0 even in the limit as j ! 1.
Given that the demand for investment good is zero, the capital-good producer opts to shut down production immediately regardless of the price of capital good and the wage rate, so the demand for labor N t+j = 0 for all j 0. Notice that even if prices are such 25 Since the zero-investment demand is caused by q t = 0, we have that q t approaches zero before (or faster than) > 0, our results continue to hold because with positive wage costs, the capital-good producer has even less incentive to hire. Hence, equation (23) remains valid.
Since the …rm value (stock price) collapses to zero with
P t+j e t+j K t+j 1 t+j P I t+j I t+j = 0;
and (with zero labor demand) the household's budget constraint then implies that aggregate consumption demand is zero from period t on, then …rms' initial pessimistic expectations about future consumption demand are self-ful…lled. Thus, the household budge constraint collapses to zero:
C t = W t P t N t + P I t P t I t W t P t N t + Z e it K it 1 it P t P I t P t I it di = e t K t 1 t P t = 0; (68) which is consistent with the goods-market clearing condition: C t = Y t 1 t Pt = 0.
By the household FOC in equations (35) and (36), will be strictly positive even if POEs do not produce; therefore, the central bank can use monetary policies to support a high enough aggregate price level P t at which both POEs and SOEs are pro…table (i.e., with revenues exceeding …xed costs for both types of …rms).
The details of the proof are as follows. First, suppose in equilibrium P t = P > SOE K for all t, then since SOE > P OE , we have e SOE = e P OE = 1,
, and
. Clearly, since the two types of …rms face the same competitive prices P I and nominal wage W , the desired investment rate and steady-state capital stock are identical, K P OE = K SOE ; consequently, the output levels Y h it are also identical:
Equations (54) and (56) imply
Equation (55) implies P = 1 M K P + , which implies
where the steady-state optimal capital stock K is determined by the following equation:
which is identical to equation (65). Given K , equation (71) by assumption. Therefore, it is pro…table for both POEs and SOEs to produce.
Second, we show that as long as SOE …rms commit to operating (producing and investing) regardless of pro…ts, then the allocation at which POEs do not operate (produce and invest)
is not an equilibrium. We prove this by contradiction.
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(i) Suppose K P OE = K SOE = K and P t < P OE K for all t such that it is not pro…table for either POEs or SOEs to produce, but by assumption SOEs will always operate despite negative pro…ts. Since SOEs can invest at the otherwise optimal rate I = , so SOEs are pro…table.
Given that SOE > P OE by assumption, if the price level is high enough to pro…t SOE …rms, it must also be high enough for the POE …rms to make positive pro…ts provided that the capital stock of POEs K P OE t is no less than that of the SOEs, K
(ii) Suppose K P OE t < K SOE t = K . Since investment is a jump variable, given the prospect of positive revenue in the SOE sector, the price level should be high enough to motivate POE …rms to invest to the desired level K such that P t K > P OE . Thus P t K P OE < P OE can never be an equilibrium.
(iii) Suppose K P OE t < K SOE t = K and that POE …rms are borrowing constrained such that their capital stock cannot reach the desired level K instantaneously. In this case, the monetary authority can always inject enough money into the SOE sector to raise the price level so that POEs are pro…table for arbitrarily low capital stock K P OE t . Since capital K P OE t will depreciate over time without investment, the longer the government waits after a recession shock to the private sector, the larger the money injection needed to raise the price level and make …rms pro…table. Thus, in this last case (with borrowing constraints), expansionary monetary policy and expansionary …scal policy (keeping SOEs operative) must be combined to restore the full-employment equilibrium. This combined stimulus package or policy mix is exactly what was observed in China during the …nancial crisis.
